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1. Fairness of contracts – posing the problem 
One of the core problems both in general contract law and in particular in 
consumer contract law is how law should react to contract terms that appear 
as one-sided, unbalanced or unfair – many attributes have been used in this 
discourse. To what extent should unfair clauses be recognised as binding and 
should the law regulate  such clauses in other ways? Or should one assume 
that contracts almost per definitionem should be regarded as balanced, as 
they are based on the will of the parties? 
The issue of how to guarantee or promote fairness of contracts is often 
described in terms of dichotomies like freedom of contract versus fairness or 
freedom versus paternalism. However, this can oversimplify the issue. For 
example, to characterize procedural fairness rules as being in opposition to 
freedom of contract can be misleading. Rules, to be described below, that 
require the party using standard terms to let the other party acquaint itself with 
them and even to ‘flag’ particularly onerous terms, can equally well be 
understood as devices to make sure that the decision-making of the party 
receiving the terms is sufficiently informed and ‘free’ (although these rules, 
as well as those regulating the substance of the terms, may be viewed as a 
rejection of a particular form of freedom, that is, a libertarian form of 
freedom that emphasises self-reliant, self-interested freedom). The term 
‘paternalism’ in a similar fashion has even been combined with 
libertarianism.1 In addition, the term – often used to discredit regulation in 
this area – is misleading. It is intended to convey a picture of the state 
‘paternalistically’ intervening in private relationships against the will of the 
parties. However, even if mandatory private law rules may prevent one party 
relying in court on terms conflicting with those rules (that is, in fact to use the 
state – the pater – to enforce those terms), the parties are free to do what they 
want as long as they agree and there is no dispute between them. Only 
administrative or criminal law collective control of contract terms may be 
called ‘paternalist’ in the true sense. 
 
 
 
1 Sunstein and Thaler claim that libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron: 
C.R. Sunstein and R.H. Thaler (2003), ‘Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron’, 
The University of Chicago Law Review, 1159–202. More generally on the relationship between fairness and 
freedom, between ethics of self-interest/self-reliance, and ethics of protection, and the link to economic 
analysis, see C. Willett (2012) ‘General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of EU Consumer Law in the UK’, 
71 Cambridge Law Journal, 412-440, 413-4.  
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So, the issue of fairness is certainly a more complex issue than is often 
appreciated. The rules to be found in this area have many possible purposes 
that reflect different forms of justice. 
First, in contract discourse the problem of unfair contract terms is often 
raised in connection with the issue of standard form conditions. The use of 
such conditions poses obvious problems for traditional contract thinking, 
which emphasises autonomy and the will or consent of the parties as basic 
legitimating factors behind the binding force of contracts. With such a starting 
point, how can one accept that a party, who might not even have read the 
conditions and knows nothing about their content, should be bound by them? 
If this is the perceived problem, the purpose of regulation that attempts 
to remedy the problem, is to safeguard the actual consent of the party, or in 
more general terms, the substantive freedom of contract of that party. Rules 
that have this aim are focused less on the content of the outcome and more on 
the procedure for reaching the contract. They are based on some form of 
procedural justice. Procedures of negotiation and information are central in 
such an approach. 
Secondly, the focus may be on the substance of the contract rather than on 
the procedure of making contracts. In contract law, it is natural, as a starting 
point, to look at fairness with regard to the relationship between the parties to 
a contract. Discussions often focus on the balance between what the parties 
have promised to perform. It is seen as important that contracts are balanced, 
or rather, that they do not appear as too unbalanced. In so far as the purpose 
of  the  rules  is  the  promotion  of  contractual  balance  with  regard  to  the 
substance of contracts, the rules are based on the idea of commutative justice. 
Thirdly, elements of distributive justice may occasionally become relevant 
in this context as well. Here, the assessment of the fairness of the contractual 
obligation is then not primarily related to the commutative balance between 
the parties, but rather is focused on enhancing the position of weak groups of 
citizens in comparison with other groups. A good example of such contractual 
social protection is the principle of social force majeure that has been used in 
the Nordic countries.2 According to this principle, the legal consequences of 
delays in payment and other performance may be mitigated, if the ultimate 
reasons for the delay are unfavourable changes in the consumer’s health, 
work, housing or family situation. 
Fourthly, fairness rules in contract law may be used to support other soci- 
etal policies. A typical example is regulation on racism and gender equality: 
contracts  that  infringe  such  regulation  may  be  considered  unfair  for  this 
 
 
 
2 See T. Wilhelmsson (1990), ‘“Social Force Majeure” – A New Concept in 
Nordic Consumer Law’, Journal of Consumer Policy, 13, 1–14. On how this 
approach is more sensitive to the realities of many long term contractual relationships, 
see the views of the EuSoCo group, in Luca Nogler and Udo Reifner (eds) (2014), 
Life Time Contracts. Social Long-term Contracts in Labour, Tenancy and Consumer 
Credit Law, Eleven international publishing. 
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reason.3 Environmental concerns and human rights issues may influence the 
assessment of fairness as well. 
Fairness rules, in other words, may rest on a complex web of purposes and 
conceptions of justice. Most national as well as international solutions contain 
both procedural and substantive elements. Obviously up-to-date legislation on 
fairness and standard form contracting would need both. Depending on where 
the emphasis is laid, there are different approaches to the issue in different 
countries. In this chapter we look at those approaches. What approaches and 
models do we find and how do they function? 
Various techniques are used to achieve fairness in contracting. In this chap- 
ter, we will only discuss the more general methods for approaching the issue, 
both procedural solutions as well as the use of a general clause giving the 
courts the right to adjust unfair contract terms. Focused mandatory legislation 
outlawing certain specific terms is an efficient and much-used method to deal 
with the problem, but we will not discuss the use of such rules, as they often 
relate to particular contract types or issues, and the analysis therefore would 
become too detailed in this context. 
A basic division of the techniques to achieve fairness relates to the 
essentially outmoded distinction between private law and public law. In the 
perspective of private law, one looks at rules to be applied in the individual 
contractual relationship, whilst various kinds of collective enforcement 
mechanisms, detached from individual parties, have appeared on the scene 
when contractual regulation displays more ‘public’ features. As we mainly 
discuss substantive law, whilst the issue of enforcement is dealt with in other 
chapters of this book, only a short section is devoted to the latter. It is needed 
to offer a comprehensive picture of the available techniques. However, a 
deeper analysis of the role of, for example, German organisational action 
(Verbandsklage), the UK Competition and Markets Authority,5 t h e  
A u s t r a l i a n  C om p e t i t i on  a n d  C on s u m e r  C om m i s s i on , 1 a n d  
the Nordic Consumer Ombudsmen is left to the chapters on enforcement. 
 
2. The consumer protection issue 
As suggested above, a fairness approach to contract terms involves seeking to 
do some form of justice as between the parties. In the context of consumer 
 
 
 
3 See  for  example  D.  Schiek  (2000),  Differenzierte  Gerechtigkeit,  Baden- 
Baden: Nomos. 
  
5 T h e  C o m p e t i t i o n  a n d  M a r k e t s  A u t h o r i t y  ( C M A )  t o o k  o v e r  f r o m  t h e  
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in 2014. For an overview of the OFT’s achievements, see for 
example S. Bright (2000), ‘Winning the Battle against Uunfair Contract Terms’, Legal Studies, 331–
52, and on the approach of the new body, see Competition and Markets Authority (2014), Consumer 
protection - guidance on the CMA’s approach to use of its consumer powers: CMA7, London: HMSO. 
. 
                                                             
1 (SHOULD BE NOTE 6-AND THOSE FOLLOWING GO UP BY ONE ACCORDINGLY) Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (2016), A Guide to the Unfair Contract Terms Law, Commonwealth of Australia.  
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contracts, this involves focusing on problems faced by consumers, in the 
process leading to the contract and in relation to the actual substantive terms. 
In recognising and seeking to regulate these problems, a fairness approach 
rejects the libertarian version of freedom of contract which prioritises maximi- 
sation of self-reliant and self-interested freedom in relation to the way the 
contract is concluded and in relation to the substantive terms.6 
First, in relation to the process leading to the contract, where standard 
terms are concerned there is the problem of lack of transparency. Terms may 
be expressed in unclear, possibly legalistic, language and in small, and other- 
wise difficult to read, text. There may be a considerable degree of complex- 
ity, poor structuring and poor cross-referencing. This may also be 
compounded by the fact that consumers have little time to read the terms 
before making the contract; and may have little understanding of the legal 
context or how the term might affect them in practice.7 Significant ‘transac- 
tion costs’ are involved in overcoming these problems and, in practice, these 
problems will usually not be overcome.8 The first consequence then will be a 
basic lack of informed consent and the fact that the consumer will not be 
aware of the risks inherent in the substantive terms. This may mean that he 
cannot rationally compare the terms on offer with those of other traders; that 
he is unaware of the need to seek to negotiate for better terms or protect his 
interests in some other way; and that, if he enters the contract, he does so in 
ignorance of important risks to which he is exposed. In addition, the lack of 
transparency may mean that the consumer is unaware of the terms in the 
contract that are advantageous to him, so that he is less likely to take advan- 
tage of these when a dispute arises. A further problem is that consumers do 
not tend to have experience as to the types of standard terms used; nor do they 
 
 
 
6 Of the authors, Willett has presented his views on the relationship between freedom and fairness in C. Willett (2007), Fairness in 
Consumer Contracts: The Case of Unfair Terms, Aldershot: Ashgate, chapter 2, and more specifically on the tension between ethics of 
trader self-interest/consumer self-reliance and consumer protection/need, see C. Willett, ‘General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of EU 
Consumer Law in the UK’, above, note 1. Generally on ideas of procedural and substantive fairness in US literature, see F. Kessler 
(1943), ‘Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract’, Columbia Law Review, 629–42; A. Leff (1967), 
‘Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor’s New Clause’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 485–559; J. Gordley (1981), 
‘Equality in Exchange’, California Law Review, 1587–656 and M. Eisenberg (1982), ‘The Bargain Principle and its Limits’, Harvard 
Law Review, 741–801. Also, for a US view of the EC Unfair Contract Terms Directive, see W. Whitford (1995), ‘Contract Law and the 
Control of Standardized Terms in Consumer Contracts: An American Report’, European Review of Private Law, 193–210. For recent 
work on fairness standards in the context of the new Australian regime on unfair terms (Australian Consumer Law 2010 (Cth)), see the 
special edition of the University of Western Australia Law Review ((2013) 37(1)): most of the contributions focus on Australian law, but 
there is also comparative work dealing with the UK, EU and Nigeria. On proposed fairness standards in British Columbia (Canada), see R. 
Bigwood (2011-2012) ‘Fairness Awry? Reflections on the BCLI Report on Proposals for Unfair Contract Terms Relief’, 52 Can. Bus. L.J. 
197.  
 
7 See Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts (2007) (note 7), 2.3.2.1. 
8 See T. Wilhelmsson (2006), ‘Cooperation and Competition Regarding Standard 
Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts’, European Business Law Review, 49–72, at 
p. 55. Willett Fairness in Consumer Contracts (2007) (note 7), at 2.4.2.2. 
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tend to have experience as to the way in which these terms are interpreted and 
applied in practice by traders.9 
Lack of transparency also undermines competition. If the terms are not 
transparent and consumers cannot understand and compare the offerings of 
different traders, there will be no incentive for traders to compete with one 
another for the business of consumers.10 In this respect, the lack of trans- 
parency leads to a broader problem of market failure (on which, see further 
below). 
Even if a consumer is aware of what a term provides for and he does not 
wish to agree to it or is wary of agreeing to it, it may be that the trader in ques- 
tion does not offer any alternative package as standard. It may also be that 
there is no alternative package that is offered by other traders. In addition, it 
will usually also be unrealistic to expect the consumer to bargain for better 
terms. The trader will normally refuse to countenance any change in the stan- 
dard terms. This is often because it is simply inefficient to engage in bargain- 
ing over standard terms, the very purpose of which is to avoid such bargaining. 
Even if the trader is prepared to bargain, the consumer is not likely to be in a 
sufficiently strong bargaining position to persuade the trader to amend or 
remove a term. 
As to the substance of the terms,11 consumer contracts may contain terms 
that seek to allow the trader to evade important responsibilities to the 
consumer; that impose undue burdens on the consumer; and/or that compro- 
mise particular expectations that the consumer may have based on the type of 
contract being entered into and other signals that he has received. These terms 
can be argued to be particularly problematic in that they impact the private 
sphere of life and cause losses that consumers may find it particularly difficult 
 
 
 
9 See J. Wightman (2003), ‘Beyond Custom: Contracts, Contexts and the 
Recognition of Implicit Understandings’, in D. Campbell, H. Collins and J. Wightman, 
Implicit Dimensions of Contract, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 143–86, at pp. 169–70. 
10 See V. Goldberg (1974), ‘Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand’, 
Journal of Law and Economics, 461–492, at pp. 483 et seq; M. Trebilcock (1980), ‘An 
Economic Approach to the Doctrine of Unconscionability’ in B. Reiter and J. Swann 
(eds), Studies in Contract Law, Toronto: Butterworths, pp. 390–421; H. Beale (1995), 
‘Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts’, in J. Beatson and D. Friedmann, Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, 
Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 231–61, at pp. 232–3 and Willett Fairness in Consumer 
Contracts (2007) (note 7), at 2.3.2.1. 
11 See Willett Fairness in Consumer Contracts (2007) (note 7), at 2.4.2.1; and 
generally on notions of substantive unfair- ness, see P. Atiyah (1986), Essays on 
Contract, Oxford: Clarendon Press; H. Collins (1999), Regulating Contracts, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 258–66; S. Smith (2003), Contract Theory, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 352–9 and (in particular from a US perspective) Gordley 
(note 7) and P. Benson (2001), ‘The Unity of Contract Law’, in P. Benson (ed.) The 
Theory of Contract Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 118–205. 
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to absorb. In other words, there may be an impact on (and disruption to) the 
personal and private interests of consumers, whilst business losses are primar- 
ily to the firm rather than to private interests and also may be more easily 
absorbed through adjustments to prices, wages, insurance etc.12 
In relation to consumer contracts, the above issues can be viewed simply as 
an issue of the transactions costs and lack of transparency associated with stan- 
dard contracting, that is, simply as a market failure issue. In this perspective, 
the point being made is that were it not for the standard form process, there 
would be the possibility of more genuine consent and the resulting terms would 
be likely to better reflect the real preferences of consumers. However, the issue 
can also be viewed more broadly in terms of consumer protection. From this 
point of view, the argument is that (i) whether we call the standard terms prob- 
lem a market failure issue or not, consumers need protection and (ii) consumers 
should also be protected from the real possibility that there may be procedural 
unfairness and unfairness in substance even where terms are not standard and 
have been negotiated.13 Of course, it is true that the biggest problem tends to 
 
 
 
12 See Willett Fairness in Consumer Contracts (2007) (note 7), at 2.4.2.1 and Wightman (note 10), pp. 
98–9. 
13 Of course, it is not possible to wholly separate approaches based on market 
failure and consumer protection. What the law needs to do to protect consumers may 
be affected by what the market can, or cannot, do (in other words, we need to 
consider the issue not just in the context of individual relationships, but also in the 
context of broader market conditions). So, it is often suggested that the market fail- 
ure caused by the lack of transparency (a cause of ‘information asymmetry’ to use 
the language of economics) may be mitigated by the so-called ‘active margin’ of 
consumers. This is a section of consumers who have the time, resources and educa- 
tion to overcome the lack of transparency and gain a good understanding of the terms 
and their implications. This active margin of consumers may then exert market disci- 
pline on traders, with the result that terms are more substantively fair and/or that 
there is improved choice (see Trebilcock (note 11), p. 379). This may mean not only 
that we need to be less concerned as to problems of unfairness in substance and lack 
of choice; but also that it may be less important that individual consumers do not 
have bargaining power (given that this active margin may effectively be bargaining 
on behalf of the majority). 
However, this all depends upon there being a sufficiently large margin of consumers 
that reads and digests terms and makes market choices on this basis. It must be seri- 
ously questionable as to whether such a margin will often exist. It is possible that many 
of those who are ready and able to take positive steps to protect their interests will tend 
not to do so until there is a dispute. Such consumers may well scrutinise terms and/or 
seek advice as to their meaning when the trader seeks to rely upon the terms. This may 
enable such consumers to persuade traders to agree a compromise that is more 
favourable than what will be achieved by those who do not scrutinise and question the 
terms (see J. Johnston (2006), ‘The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How 
Standard Form Contracts Enable Co-operative Negotiation between Businesses and 
Consmers’, Michigan Law Review, 857–98, at p. 857, on traders using ‘managerial 
discretion to renegotiate’ standard terms). However, these will be individual victories 
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arise with standard contracts because it has traditionally been so common for 
these terms to be one-sided substantively, to contain terms that are not trans- 
parent and for there to be little difference between the standard offerings of 
different traders. However, even if a trader does not use standard terms, the 
terms he proposes may still be unclear to consumers and substantively one- 
sided. Certainly the consumer now has a greater chance of at least focusing on 
what is on offer and possibly, therefore, understanding it and seeking to 
bargain for deletion or improvement. However, (i) it is still possible that the 
consumer will not understand what is on offer (due to his lesser expertise in 
the field) and (ii) even if he does understand, he may still lack the bargaining 
power to influence the negotiation (especially if he is not, as an individual, 
particularly important to the overall market share of the trader and if he is, as 
is likely, less skilled in negotiation).14 Sometimes the consumer does not even 
have the option of choosing another trader, if the traders on the market use 
relatively similar conditions. 
    The above discussion focuses on consumer contracts. However, it can be 
argued that similar unfairness problems (of lack of transparency, choice and 
bargaining power and of unfair substantive terms) often arise in business-to- 
business contracts. Of course, it is true that, while these various problems are 
likely to exist for almost all consumers, some business contractors will not be 
affected. Nevertheless, the problems will arise in a significant number of cases 
and, as with consumer contracts, the issue in commercial contracts may be 
viewed simply as a standard contracts/market failure problem; or unfairness 
can also be recognised as possible even where the contract is not standardised. 
On one view, a regime on standard terms should recognise the similarities 
between consumer and commercial contracts by subjecting both to a general 
clause on fairness (the flexible nature of which should be capable of taking 
into account those cases just mentioned – where the business subject to the 
terms is not in fact in need of protection).2 Another reason for such an approach 
is that it may actually enhance consumer protection. If a business such as a 
retailer of goods is protected from the economic burden of unfair terms used 
 
 
 
and will not serve to discipline what traders offer in general (see Whitford (note 6), pp. 
195–9). 
The limited potential for market discipline is shown in particular by the behavioural 
economists who demonstrate that consumers are often likely not to scrutinise and 
complain about terms in as rational a manner as might be assumed (see R. Korobkin 
(2003),  ‘Bounded  Rationality,  Standard  Form  Contracts  and  Unconscionability’, 
University of Chicago Law Review, 1203–95, at 1203); for instance, due to a tendency 
to underestimate the risk (see S. Della Vigna and U. Malmendier (2006), ‘Paying Not 
                                                             
2 (SHOULD BE NOTE 15-SO WHAT IS NOW 14 BECOMES 16 AND SO ON) On the case for protecting small businesses at least in 
the UK context, see English and Scottish Law Commissions (2005) Unfair Terms in Contracts, Nos. 242, 199, London: Law Commission, 
Part 5 (78-99); and in the Australian context, A. Freilich and E. Webb (2013), ‘Small Business - Forgotten and in Need of Protection from 
Unfairness’, 37 University of Western Australia Law Review, 134. One of the functions of the Nordic general fairness model (see below 
section 3) is also to provide protection for small businesses, 
. 
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to Go to the Gym’, American Economic Review, 694–719, at 695). On similar lines, 
see M.G. Faure and H.A. Luth (2011), ‘Behavioural Economics in Unfair Contract 
Terms: Cautions and Considerations’, 34 Journal of Consumer Policy, 337-358,   
Generally also on these and associated issues see A. Leff (1970), ‘Contract as 
Thing’, American University Law Review, 131–57 and T.D. Rakoff (1983), ‘Contracts 
of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction’, 96, Harvard Law Review,1173–284. 
14 See Willett Fairness in Consumer Contracts (2007) (note 7), at 2.4.2.2. 
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by his supplier, the retailer may be less inclined to feel the need to pass on 
risks to consumers through the terms of his contract with the consumer. In 
other words, the retailer may be more likely to comply with the fairness stan- 
dards imposed on these terms. 
Of course, arguments can be made against the instatement of a 
fairness/good faith principle in commercial contracts, for example, that 
commercial contracting is and should be premised on an adversarial ethic, 
freedom-oriented autonomy, certainty, and a strong focus on particular 
contracting contexts; and that general fairness/good faith principles and rules 
are corrosive of all of these values.15 The various opinions on this issue may 
be related to deeper layers of legal and business culture in different countries. 
It has been argued, for example, that the less fairness-friendly English tradition 
is connected with a more competitive business culture than that prevailing in 
the more cooperative German and Nordic economies.3 
 
3. Four basic models 
Differing assessments of the need to regulate unfair contract terms and stan- 
dard form contracts, as well as various understandings of the purposes and 
conceptions of justice of such regulation, as outlined above, have led to very 
different approaches to the issue in different countries. Acknowledging that 
there are many variations on the regulatory themes that surface in this context, 
one may perhaps group the ways to deal with the issue into a couple of larger 
categories or models. Here four models are distinguished: the no particular 
problem model, the standard form contract model, the consumer protection 
model and the general fairness model. 
As the purposes mentioned are usually intertwined in practice, the models 
cannot directly be tied to the conceptions of justice analysed in the previous 
section, even though there are some obvious connections. For example, the 
standard form contract model, like the no particular problem model, seems 
most closely connected with procedural justice, whilst the consumer protec- 
tion model and the general fairness model are often more preoccupied with 
achieving commutative justice. The Nordic general fairness model rather 
eclectically includes all the above-mentioned forms of justice. Of course, in 
most models, at least traces of all the above-mentioned conceptions of justice 
can be found, as will be demonstrated later. 
The no particular problem model is based on the belief that the general 
rules on making and appl ying contracts basically produce just results, in 
safeguarding to some extent the free will and consent of both parties and 
perhaps acknowledging the need to adjust the contract in case of changed 
circumstances. What the parties have agreed on, without fraud or force, has 
to be considered just, precisely because they have agreed on it, and the law 
should recognise their 
 
 
 
                                                             
3 The German legal theorist Gunther Teubner has therefore called the good faith principle of the EU Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive a ’legal irritant’ in English law, see Teubner (1998) ’Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law 
Ends Up in New Divergences’, Modern Law Review 61, 11-32. 
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agreement. Interference against unfair contract terms is warranted only in 
particular cases for particular reasons. 
UK law, prior to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, could be viewed as 
an expression of such a model because the common law and equitable rules did 
not regulate unfair terms in any systematic way.16 And the Unfair Contracts 
Terms Act did not radically change the situation. Even though this Act had a 
rather broad scope, as its general clause on ‘reasonableness’ covered both stan- 
dard and individual terms in consumer contracts as well as standard terms in 
business contracts, still one could claim that the no particular problem model 
continued to apply even after the adoption of the Act, as the Act did not 
apply to terms imposing obligations and liabilities, but only covered exemption 
clauses. This situation continued until implementation of the EC Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive,17 which required UK law to properly regulate terms imposing 
oblig- ations and liabilities in consumer contracts. Recen t l y the UK 
domestic approach has shown some signs of moving in the direction of 
other models. A decade ago, the Law Commissions proposed, with regard to 
commercial contracts, that there should be control not only of exemption 
clauses in standard form contracts but also of terms imposing obligations and 
liabilities, at least where the affected party is a small business; and in 2015 the 
UK Dept for Business Innovation and Skill (BIS) consulted on the same idea,18 
although it is not clear if this idea will be taken up. However, the Law 
Commissions also suggested with regard to consumer contracts, that UK law 
should take advantage of the minimum clause in the EU Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive19 and remove the exemption of individually negotiated terms, thereby 
adopting a more full-blooded consumer protection model.20 This has now been 
done. The new UK Consumer Rights Act which now contains the regime 
implementing the Directive, does not contain the individually negotiated term 
exemption.  
The standard form contract model is a developed version of the general 
contract law approach. In this model, the reality of contractual consent in rela- 
tion to standard form contracts is problematised. Problems of unfair- ness 
appear that cannot be remedied with the help of general contract law rules alone. 
Particular regulation of standard form contracts is required. 
The most well-known example of national regulation focusing on standard 
form conditions is the German Act on General Conditions from 1976.21 This 
 
 
 
16 So, for example, the unconscionability rule discussed below set a very low 
standard and other rules tended to apply to particular aspects (such as the process of 
agreement – on which see below – or specific types of term such as penalty clauses and 
other agreed remedies – see Willett, Fairness in Consumer Contracts (2007) (note 7), 
at 8.1). Statutory intervention was limited to control of specific types of exclusion 
clause, for example, the controls on excluding or restricting the implied terms as to title, 
description, quality and fitness introduced by the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 
1973. 
17 Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts. 
18 See Law Commissions (note 15)( the joint Report by the English and Scottish 
Law Commissions (2005), at 78–99; BIS, Protection of Small Businesses when 
Purchasing Goods and Services (2015), London: BIS, 6,13, 16, 21 & 27. 
19 See Article 8. 
20 Law Commissions, supra, at 31–2. See further below on the exemption of individually negotiated 
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Act, which dealt both with the problem of incorporation and interpretation of 
standard form conditions, as well as with the fairness problem, only applied 
to standard form conditions (general contract conditions). It did not relate to 
consumer protection in partic- ular, but was based on the recognition of a 
partial market failure occurring when standard terms are used. It controlled 
standard terms in both consumer and commercial contracts.22 Later, in the 
German Schuldrechtsreform, these provisions were included in the Civil 
Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) in a specific chapter on general contract 
conditions.23 Provisions on general condi- tions (algemene voorwaarden) have 
been included in a specific part of the modern Dutch Civil Code as well.24 
The German Act has had a strong influence on the content of the EU Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive. The preparation of the Directive started from the 
assumption that all consumer contracts, both standard form contracts and indi- 
vidually negotiated contracts, should be covered.25 However, this was criti- 
cised, especially in German doctrine: the fairness control of individually 
negotiated contracts was said to be in conflict with private autonomy and the 
functioning of the market economy.26 This criticism led to the result that the 
scope of application of the adopted Directive was restricted to contracts which 
have ‘not been individually negotiated’.27 
The consumer protection model rather looks at the typical imbalance 
between the parties in the consumer market. The basic ethos of such a model 
is consumer protection. The starting point is not the perceived conflict 
between contractual will and superimposed standard terms, but rather the typi- 
fied strength of bargaining power of consumers as compared to traders. The 
delimiting criterion for protective measures in this model is the consumer- 
trader relationship rather than the way in which the contract was made (indi- 
vidually or based on standard terms). 
Admittedly, in practice it is not always easy to distinguish the models, and 
they can be combined. Such a combination has expressly been used in the EU 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive, as its scope is delimited both by reference to 
standard terms (more specifically: terms not individually negotiated) and to 
 
 
 
22 See for example R. Zimmermann (2005), ‘Consumer Contract Law  and General 
Contract Law: The German Experience’, Current Legal Problems, 415–89, at 431–35. 
23 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts, BGB Articles 305–10. 
24 See the Dutch Civil Code, Articles 6:231–247. 
25 See the 1990 proposal: OJ 1990 C243/3. 
26 H.E. Brandner and P. Ulmer (1991), ‘The Community Directive on Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts: Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal Submitted by 
the EC Commission’, Common Market Law Review, 647–62, at 652 et seq. 
27 Article 3. 
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consumer relationships. However, as the Directive was prepared solely with 
consumer relationships as its object of regulation, the Directive as to its 
content appears as a good example of the consumer protection model. The 
conception of ‘consumer’ that the Directive uses is rather absolute, as it 
excludes those businesses that buy for any significant business purpose,28 in 
contrast to those definitions that view a business as a consumer when the busi- 
ness buys outside its normal field.29 
The French approach has followed the consumer protection model even 
more clearly. It applies the controls over unfair terms only to consumer 
contracts, but includes within these controls individually negotiated (that is, 
non-standard) terms.30 
Finally, the general fairness model is the most far-reaching, including both 
consumer relationships and business-to-business relationships within the 
scope of fairness rules, and extending those rules to cover not only standard 
terms but also individually negotiated terms. Such a model recognises that the 
contract mechanisms can lead to unfair results in all kinds of relationships and 
with regard to all kind of terms, and underlines that the enforcement machin- 
ery of the state should not be made available to put into effect contracts that 
are considerably unfair. The principle of fairness therefore is not a limited 
principle for consumer relations or standard form contracting, but it should 
permeate the whole contract law. 
A well-known example of legislation that is based on the general fairness 
model is that contained in Nordic contract law. Probably the most (interna- 
tionally) well-known provision in Nordic contract law is the general clause in 
§ 36 of the Nordic Contract Acts,31 according to which a court may set aside 
or adjust a contract term, if its application leads to unfair results. As the 
general clause focuses on the consequences of application of a term, the courts 
can make use of it both when a term was unfair already when the contract was 
made and when a change of circumstances leads to unfairness. Of course, even 
though the general clause is generally applicable, a considerable part of the 
 
 
 
28 See Article 2(b) and the discussion by P. Nebbia (2007), Unfair Contract 
Terms in European Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 71–8. 
29 See the approach taken by the English Court of Appeal in R&B Customs 
Brokers v. UTD [1988] 1 WLR 321. 
30 Loi Scrivener 1978 and now Code de la Consommation, Article L212-1. 
31 In Sweden, Lag om avtal och andra rättshandlingar på förmögenhetsrättens 
område (1915:218), the general clause added by Act 1976:185; in Finland, Laki varal- 
lisuusoikeudellisista oikeustoimista (228/1929), the general clause added by Act 
956/82; in Norway, Avtaleloven (1918/4), the general clause added by Act 1983/160; 
and in Denmark, Lov om aftaler og andra retshandler på formuerettens område 
(1986/600). 
Howells Part 2 30/11/09 8:56 am  Page 172 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unfair terms and standard form contracts 169 
 
case-law concerns consumer contracts. However, many interesting decisions 
concerning business-to-business contracts have been made as well. 
UK, German, European and Nordic law can in other words be used as 
paradigmatic examples of the four models. Other examples from various juris- 
dictions are added in the following section. As the consumer protection model 
– in use in the EU Directive - is of central interest in the present Handbook, 
dealing with consumer law issues, this will be described in somewhat more 
detail in the next sections of the chapter. In addition, these sections will refer 
to consumer protection elements in the other models in various countries. 
 
4. Purely procedural protection 
In particular, in the standard form contract model, the focus of the regulation 
is on the procedural issue, that is how and to what extent standard terms devel- 
oped by one party become binding for the other party. Rules concerning incor- 
poration of the terms into the contract are developed to deal with this problem. 
These rules may be supplemented for example by rules on interpretation that 
regard the procedure in which the contract was made (the use of standard 
terms) as an important factor in determining the content of the contract. Of 
course, also in countries in which the basic approach to these issues rather 
follows the ‘no particular problem’ model, the consumer protection model 
or the general fairness model, one can usually find at least some rules or 
practices on standard terms of this procedural kind. 
In practice, there are many ways for a party to attempt to incorporate stan- 
dard form conditions into an individual contract, ranging from having the 
conditions printed in the contract document to only short – or in some cases 
even implied – references to the conditions in the contract or on some ticket, 
notice or other document available at the time of making the contract. This is 
not the place to discuss the specific legal niceties of the techniques of incor- 
poration found in various jurisdictions. Instead, we can take a closer look at 
some more or less common general solutions which are designed to create 
some consistency between the recognition of standard form conditions and the 
requirement of contractual consent, that is, to address the problems of lack of 
transparency discussed above. 
From a practical point of view, it is obviously impossible to require genuine 
consent in all cases when standard terms are used, in the sense that a party 
should have read the terms, understood them and accepted them. In many situ- 
ations, parties do not bother to read the terms, and probably even should not 
bother to do so.4 On the other hand, it would not be acceptable to give force to 
more or less ‘secret’ norms that are totally beyond the reach of the party. 
Consequently, the usual compromise solution is to construct a kind of potential 
consent. It is seen as a minimum requirement for the conditions to become 
binding on a party that this party has had at least an opportunity to acquaint 
itself with the conditions when the contract was made. 
                                                             
4 If consumers did read all the conditions they are offered, physically or virtually, this would yearly amount to days of 
condition-reading. Strangely, consumer economics often neglects the important issue of consumer transaction costs. 
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In fact, such a rule is applied in many countries. German law expressly 
requires that a party shall have a reasonable opportunity to become 
acquainted with the conditions in order to be bound by them.32 A similar rule 
can be found in the Dutch Civil Code.33 The doctrine and practice in the 
Nordic countries have developed along the same lines.34 Even secondary EU 
law recognises, at least indirectly, the need to have access to the standard 
form conditions. In the Annex to the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, which 
contains an ‘indicative’ list of terms that may be regarded as unfair, example 
(i) refers to a term which has the object or effect of ‘irrevocably binding the 
consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of becoming 
acquainted before the conclusion of the contract’. The EU Electronic 
Commerce Directive, again, even requires that the conditions ‘must be made 
available in a way that allows him [the recipient] to store and reproduce 
them’.35 Although there are jurisdictions where this requirement of 
possibility of acquaintance has not been adopted,36 it seems justified as a 
minimum rule if one wishes to respect, at least as a fiction, the ideas behind 
the traditional procedural contract paradigm. 
 
 
 
32 After the Schuldrechtsreform, this provision is in BGB § 305(2): ‘die 
Möglichkeit . . . in zumutbarer Weise . . . von ihrem Inhalt Kenntnis zu nehmen’ (own 
translation: ‘reasonable opportunity to take note of the contents’). On US law on incor- 
poration, see s. 203 of the Restatement of contracts. 
33 Article 6:233(b). 
34 For example, U. Bernitz (1993), Standardavtalsrätt, 6th edition, Stockholm: 
Marknadsrättsförlaget, p. 32 and T. Wilhelmsson (2008), Standardavtal och oskäliga 
avtalsvillkor, 3rd edition, Helsingfors: Talentum, p. 69. 
35 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular elec- 
tronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), OJ 2000, 
L178/1, Article 10(3). 
36 In English law, for example, terms can sometimes be incorporated merely by 
reference even though there may have been no real opportunity to become acquainted 
with them. See Thompson v. LMS [1930] 1 KB 41 and J. Adams (1994), 
‘Unconscionability and the Standard Form Contract’, in R. Brownsword, G. Howells 
and T. Wilhelmsson (eds), Welfarism in Contract Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth, pp. 
230–47, at p. 243. However, even in English law the ‘red hand’ rule discussed below 
now applies where appropriate. In US law, a very unorthodox form of ‘consent’ has 
been accepted: in cases where the conditions cannot be seen prior to conclusion of the 
contract (because they are in the box with the product), there has been deemed to be 
consent if the consumer does not return the goods within 30 days (Hill v. Gateway 
(2000) Federal Circuit Court (7th Circuit). The problem here is that although there is 
this period of reflection and this is greater than is often available where terms are avail- 
able just prior to purchase, even if consumers do take time to read the terms and decide 
they do not like them, there may be psychological and practical barriers that make it 
unlikely that consumers will actually send back the goods. For a recent discussion of 
Hill v. Gateway in the broader context of agreement and fairness rules, see A. Bagchi 
(2016), ‘At the Limits of Adjudication: Standard Terms in Consumer Contracts’, in L. 
Di Matteo and M. Hogg, Comparative Contract Law: British and American 
Perspectives, Oxford: OUP, 439, 441-2.  
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However, in many countries law goes further than this within the proce- 
dural paradigm. A so-called ‘red hand rule’ is in force in a number of 
countries, th is being designed to prevent a party sneaking onerous terms 
into a contract without the knowledge of the other party,. According to 
German law, surprising terms – terms which the other party would not have 
expected – are not binding.37 Such terms become effective only if the party 
who wishes to rely on them specifically informs the other party before the 
conclusion of the contract. Similar rules are to be found in other countries as 
well.38 
The acceptance of a ‘red hand rule’ should not, however, be seen as a radi- 
cal departure from a traditional procedural contract paradigm, but rather as an 
attempt to take such a paradigm seriously.39 The basic problem of a procedural 
paradigm is the fact that even informed consent, when given by a party in an 
inferior bargaining position, may not ensure that the contract is fair; so fair- 
ness in substance is not ensured by the ‘red hand rule’. It therefore represents 
only a partial solution to the problems under consideration and does not elim- 
inate the need for a substantive fairness provision.40 
Traditionally courts have often tried to relieve the problems connected with 
the use of standard form conditions with the help of specific approaches to the 
interpretation of such conditions. 
The rule on interpretation of standard form conditions in dubio contra 
 
 
 
37 BGB § 305c(1). 
38 See for Austria, ABGB § 864a; for England, for example Interfoto Picture 
Library v. Stiletto Visual Programmes [1988] 1 All ER 348 and AEG (UK) v. Logic 
Resource [1996] CLC 265; and for the Nordic countries, Bernitz (note 34), pp. 36 et 
seq., and Wilhelmsson (note 36), pp. 88 et seq. There is what appears to be a variation 
on this approach in the US Restatement of Contracts, s. 211 which says that a standard 
term is not part of the agreement if it is shown that the party relying on the term has 
reason to believe that the other party would not have assented to it if he had known of 
it. This appears less protective than the traditional red hand approach which simply 
focuses on the objective question as to whether the term is very unusual or unfair (if it 
is, special highlighting is required), while the US approach depends on the subjective 
perspective of the user of the term. However, it does, in common with the red hand 
approach, appear to give an incentive to traders to highlight terms that they should 
know are very unfair and that the other party would be unlikely to wish to agree to. 
39 Although a traditional freedom of contract approach committed to  self- reliance 
and self-interest would still wish to minimise the steps that must be taken to make 
terms more transparent – see Willett (note 7), at 2.3.2.2. 
40 Indeed, another issue is whether the red hand rule applies to signed docu- 
ments. Clearly, it should if the consumer is to be protected, as it hardly seems any more 
likely in practice that a consumer will have read and noticed a term simply because he 
signed the document. However, although the rule is applied to signed documents by the 
Canadian courts (see Tilden Rent-a-Car v. Glendinning (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 400, 18 
OR (2d) 601 (CA); this is not the case in England (see L’Estrange v. Graucob [1934] 
2 KB 934 and Peninsula Business Services v. Sweeney [2004] IRLR 49). 
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stipulatorem or contra proferentem is very widely accepted in European juris- 
dictions and in common law tradition.41 It has also been introduced into EC 
law in the context of consumer relations through the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive.42 
However, in this context, one may ask whether it is a good idea to restrict 
the scope of this rule only to standard form conditions (or terms not individu- 
ally negotiated). One might also support a more general rule on interpretation, 
according to which contract terms ‘supplied by one party’ should be preferen- 
tially interpreted against that party. Such a rule always puts the party that was 
responsible for a lack of clarity at an interpretative disadvantage.43 In contrast 
to a rule restricted only to standard form conditions, such a general rule avoids 
conveyance of the impression that problems of balance due to one-sided draft- 
ing do not exist within less standardised contracts. 
It is also worth mentioning the rule that individually negotiated terms take 
preference over standardised ones, which seems to be an equally generally 
accepted rule of interpretation.44 . This rather self- evident rule can hardly 
be disputed. However, in consumer relationships it might, from an 
informational point of view, be useful to emphasise expressly, for example, 
that oral agreements can supersede standard form conditions. 
 
5. Individual fairness clauses blending procedural and substantive 
reasons 
We have already seen the ways in which rules on incorporation and interpre- 
tation can be formulated to deal purely with the transparency aspect of proce- 
dural fairness. We now turn to the possible approaches to a more general 
strategy that deals both with the issues of procedural fairness (including, but 
extending beyond, transparency) and fairness in substance. Within a fairness- 
oriented approach, the agenda is to balance the interests of the parties and in 
particular to protect the interests of the consumer. This means being cognisant 
of the ways in which terms may in substance be damaging to consumer inter- 
ests; and the problems of procedural fairness that may arise. 
 
 
 
41 See, for example, as examples on legislation, the German BGB § 305c(2), the 
Austrian ABGB § 915, the Italian CC Article 1370, UK cases such as Andrews Bros 
(Bournemouth) Ltd v. Singer & Co [1934]1 KB 17 and Hollier v. Rambler Motors 
(AMC) Ltd [1972] 2 QB 71, and the US Restatement of Contracts, s. 206. 
42 Article 5. 
43 See for example the extensive analysis by K. Huser (1983), Avtaletolking, 
Bergen, Oslo, Stavanger, Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget, pp. 553 et seq. For a general 
legislative formulation, see for example Austrian law, ABGB § 915 and Spanish law, 
CC Article 1288. 
44 See for example BGB § 305b and s. 211 of the US Restatement of Contracts. 
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Looking at the issue from an international perspective, we find that the 
modern trend is to regulate unfairness and standard terms by use of a particu- 
lar regulatory form – the ‘general clause’. The precise expression of what is 
not accepted of course varies. So, within Europe the EU Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive standard is expressed as a test of ‘unfairness’.45 However, 
this is then defined in terms of ‘significant imbalance’ (focusing principally on 
the substance of the terms) and ‘good faith’ (focusing on both substance and 
the question of procedural fairness).46 Of course, EU law allows member 
states freedom in the way they express concepts deriving from Directives, 
so long as the substantive effects are achieved. So, we find that the Nordic 
countries have continued simply to refer to ‘fairness’.47 In Germany, focus is 
on ‘good faith’ and ‘unreasonable disadvantage’ (a model that also appears to 
focus on substance and procedure and that was strongly influential on the test 
used in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive).48 Originally,  in  the UK the 
‘fair and reasonable’ test (covering substantive and procedural elements49) 
was used in the law that predated the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive;50 
while the law implementing the Directive copied out the test from the 
Directive.51 Now, however, fol lowing proposals by the Law 
Commissions there is a unified r egime, which copies out the test 
from the Directive .52 
In other parts of the common law world, an important trend has been to use 
the concept of ‘unconscionability’ to regulate standard terms.53 This concept 
originates in the English law of equity and still exists in England.54 In England 
 
 
 
45 Article 3. 
46 See Willett (note 7), at 5.7–5.8. 
47 Nordic Contracts Acts, Article 36. 
48 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts, BGB Article 307 (1). 
49 See Willett (note 7), at 4.6. 
50 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, s. 11. 
51 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, regulation 5(1). 
52 See English and Scottish Law Commissions (2005), above, note 15, at 21–
56, and Consumer Rights Act 2015, s. 62 (4).  
53   See for example Uniform Commercial Code, 2-302 (US); Harry v. Kreutziger 
(1978) 95 DLR (3d) 231, 9 BCLR 166 (CA) (Canada); and Commercial Bank of 
Australia v. Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 46 ALR 442 (HCA) and Trade Practices Act 
1974, s. 51 AB(2)(b) (Australia, until recently, but now see below). Generally on the 
US concept of unconscionability see Leff (note 7);; E.A. Farnsworth (2004), 
Contracts, 4th edition, Frederick, MD: Aspen Law and Business; and P.A. Alces 
(2016), ‘The Death of Consent’, in L. Di Matteo and M. Hogg, Comparative Contract 
Law: British and American Perspectives (note 38), 30, at 45-52. 
54 See generally M. Chen-Wishart (2015), Contract Law, 5th edition, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, chapter 9 and cases such as Lloyds Bank v. Bundy [1975] 1 
QB 326 (C.A), Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v. Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 
87 and Boustany v. Piggott (1995) 69 P & CR 298. 
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(and in the various other jurisdictions) the unconscionability concept tends (in 
common with the tests referred to above) to adopt a combined substantive and 
procedural analysis.55 In English law the approach is to consider whether the 
substantive terms are overreaching and oppressive and whether these are the 
result of the stronger party having taken advantage of the very vulnerable posi- 
tion of the other (weaker) party.56 This is one of the possible approaches in 
Canada; the other being whether the transaction as a whole is sufficiently out 
of line with community standards of commercial morality57 (an approach 
which seems sufficiently open textured to allow for consideration of both 
substantive and procedural elements). The US also focuses on unfairness in 
substance in combination with the question as whether there has been proce- 
dural fairness (with a dual procedural focus on whether there has been oppres- 
sion and whether there has been ‘unfair surprise’, the latter being concerned, 
at least in part, with the question as to the transparency of the terms).58 In 
Australia, unconscionability is also based on a combined procedural and 
substantive analysis.59 However, a particular problem with the uncon- 
scionability doctrine in general relates to whether it is capable of setting a 
reasonably high standard of protection. T h i s  i s  on e  r e a s on  t h a t  
A u s t r a l i a  h a s  r e c e n t l y d e c i d e d  t o  t a c k l e  u n fa i r  t e r m s  i n  
s t a n d a r d  c on s u m e r  c on t r a c t s  v i a  a  m od e r n  s t a t u t o r y  t e s t ,  
a t  t h e  c o r e  o f  wh i c h  i s  t h e  ‘ s i g n i f i c a n t  i m ba l a n c e ’  
c on c e p t  d e r i v i n g  f r om  t h e  E U  Un fa i r  T e r m s  D i r e c t i v e .  
Later, we will develop this discussion as to the levels of protection offered by 
the various types of test.  
Of course, in order to properly understand and regulate unfairness, we must 
go much further than just discussing the various phrases used in the general 
clauses and the broad idea of a procedural and substantive enquiry. Any rules 
need to be as clear as possible as to the type of problems being addressed and 
the way in which issues should interact within a test. Lack of certainty is a 
well- known concern in relation to assessments of fairness. This problem is 
affected in part by the kind of decision makers and standard setters involved 
in the process. Where adjudication takes place purely in the context of private 
law litigation, a key problem is that there will always tend to be a shortage of 
precedent upon which to base the structuring and development of an assess- 
ment of fairness.60 We shall see later that this problem has been reduced by 
the fact that public and collective enforcement is also involved and this has 
 
 
 
55 See Willett (note 7), at 8.1.2. 
56 See Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v. Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 
87 and Lloyds Bank v. Bundy [1975] 1 QB 326 (CA). 
57 See Harry v. Kreutziger (1978) 95 DLR (3d) 231, 9 BCLR 166 (C), and for the development of the 
unconscionability doctrine in Canada from English law roots, see S. Waddams (2010), ‘Abusive or 
Unconscionable Clauses from a Common Law Perspective’ 49 Can Bus LJ 378. Note also the recent 
Canadian Supreme Court decision (Bhasin v Hrynew 2014 SCC 71) recognizing a general principle of 
good faith in Canadian contract law, and conceptualizing the rule against unconscionability as being a 
component of the duty of ‘honest performance’ that flowed from the good faith such a general duty; and 
the yet more recent case of Bank of Montreal v Javed 2016 ONCA 49 discussing the application of this 
duty to contractual performance. 
 58 See Uniform Commercial Code, 2-302 (US) (Official Commentary), J. Winn and M. Webber (2006), 
‘The Impact of EU Unfair Contract Terms Law on U.S. Business-to-Consumer Internet Merchants’, The 
Business Lawyer, 1–20, p. 9, and Alces (note 55). 
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59 See Commercial Bank of Australia v. Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 46 ALR 
442 (HCA). 
60 See Collins (note 12), p. 293. 
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contributed hugely to the development of the jurisprudence. Another factor 
contributing to clear and rational development of the law is the existence of 
specific guidelines for the application of whatever test is to be applied.61 
However, quite apart from specific guidelines, there needs to be a more general 
overview of the types of factors that might be regarded as important; and how 
they should relate to one another. 
As to types of terms covered by the general clauses, many of the 
general clauses have a broad scope. Indeed, the most effective model must 
be one that applies a general clause to all (except positively excluded) terms. 
This provides the flexibility to deal with any form of substantively unfair 
term that may be currently be in use, or that may be developed in the future. 
This approach was common in continental civil traditions and was adopted 
in the E U  Unfair Contract Terms Directive.62 Of course, the challenge, 
then, is to reintroduce an element of certainty by seeking to work out what 
types of unfairness in substance such a test is most focused on. 
This challenge is, for example in the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
and the German tradition, dealt with (in part) by the use of a ‘grey list’ or 
‘indicative list’ of terms that are particularly likely to be unfair.63 This clearly 
focuses all parties on the typically problematic terms; certainly in the UK 
 
 
 
61 The Unfair Contract Terms Directive has been criticised – in particular in 
common law quarters – for giving limited specific guidelines in relation to assessing 
fairness. There is a very bland reference to ‘all the circumstances attending the conclu- 
sion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on 
which it is dependent’ (Article 4(1)). The Preamble (in discussing the good faith 
element of the test at Recital 16) also makes fairly vague references to dealing ‘fairly 
and equitably’ and taking into account the ‘legitimate interests’ of the consumer; 
although it does also make specific reference to the bargaining positions of the parties, 
whether the consumer received an inducement to agree to the term and whether the 
goods or services were supplied to the special order of the consumer. By contrast, in 
relation to the new UK regime, UK Law Commissions had proposed almost 30 specific 
guidelines on matters relating to the substance of the contract and the issues of 
transparency, choice and bargaining power; see English and Scottish Law 
Commissions (2005) (note ??), at 158–61. These were not included, however, in the 
regime finally adopted under the Consumer Rights Act 2015.  
62 The test in the Directive applies to all terms except those specifically identi- 
fied, that is, terms reflecting mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions (Article 
1(2)), individually negotiated terms (Article 3(1)) and ‘price’ and ‘main subject 
matter’ terms (Article 4(2)). 
63 Article 3(3) and the Annex to the Directive and Gesetz zur Modernisierung des 
Schuldrechts, BGB Article 308. 
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experience, it seems to have formed the focal point of much of the work of the 
enforcement bodies.64 However, such lists are never complete and it is neces- 
sary to seek to find some bridge between the list and the general clause – some 
form of guiding principle(s). One way to approach this issue is to use default 
rules (including implied terms) and remedies as benchmarks of fairness and to 
question in particular the fairness of terms that are detrimental to the consumer 
by comparison with such default rules or remedies.65 This approach is 
provided for explicitly in the German approach.66 In  t h e  f i r s t  e d i t i on  
o f  t h i s  b o ok ,  w e  a r g u e d  t h a t  s u c h  a n  a p p r oa c h  wa s  implicit 
in the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive: there typically being a significant 
imbalance to the detriment of the consumer where a term deviates from the 
default position.67 Now, this appears to have the support of the CJEU. In the 
case of the Mohamed Aziz,5 the Court states that the concept of ‘significant 
imbalance’ has to be ‘assessed in the light of an analysis of the rules of national 
law’ (i.e. the default rules) in order to determine to what extent the consumer 
is placed in a less favourable position (than these default rules)..68 The broad 
justification for such an approach is that default rules and remedies are based 
on some kind of balancing of the interests of the parties.69 So, for example, in 
English law rules on damages exist to compensate for the losses of the innocent 
party, but only in so far as these are not too remote70 and the innocent party 
has taken reasonable steps to mitigate his or her losses.71 
However, there are not default rules dealing with every conceivable issue. 
For example, there is often no default rule dealing with whether and when the 
 
 
 
64 See, for example, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) Guidance on Unfair 
Terms, 2001 and the many bulletins published by the OFT on enforcement of the law, 
and note that the new enforcement authority has carried over much of the practice of 
the OFT-see Capital Markets Authority (note 5), 58-9. Note also that in applying the 
concept of unfairness under the Unfair Terms Directive, although the CJEU tends to 
leave decisions on particular terms to national courts, it increasingly refers to 
paragraphs from the indicative list in its reasoning: e.g., Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-
244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero and Salvat Editores SA v 
José M. Sánchez Alcón Prades, José Luis Copano Badillo, Mohammed Berroane and 
Emilio Viñas Feliú [2000] ECR I-4941, para 22, Case C-137/08 VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v 
Ferenc Schneider [2010] ECR I-10847, para 54, Case C-472/10 Nemzeti 
Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt.[2012], paras 24-26, Case C-92/11 
RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV [2013], paras 46, 49 
and 52, and Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona 
i Manresa (Catalunyacaixa) [2013], para 75. 
65 See Willett (note 7), at 2.4.3.2. 
66 See the German BGB, § 307(2)1. We also tend to find a similar approach in 
other systems, for example, see Nebbia (note 30), p. 154 (Italy) and Beaulieu v. Day 
and Ross Inc [2005] NBJ No. 77 (CA) (Canada). 
67 See Willett (note 7), at 5.7.3. 
68 This also seems to be broadly supported by the approach of the House of Lords 
(as it was, now the Supreme Court) in the UK: see in particular the judgement of Lord 
Bingham in First National Bank v DGFT 3 WLR 1297, 1307-8. 
                                                             
5 Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa (Catalunyacaixa) [2013], para 76. So 
also Case C-226/12 Constructora Principado SA v José Ignacio Menéndez Álvarez [2014].  
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69  Of course, not all default rules or implied terms are necessarily based on inter- est 
balancing. They may be based on presumed consent, the norms of the trading sector, 
business efficacy, economic efficiency, some combination of these criteria or on some 
other basis. On these issues, see generally C. Riley (2000), ‘Designing Default Rules 
in Contract Law, Consent, Conventionalism and Efficiency’, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, 367–90. The simple point for present purposes is that default rules will often 
represent a more objective attempt to balance the interests of the parties than do terms 
drafted by the trader. 
70 Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341; Victoria Laundries (Windsor) Ltd v. 
Newman Industries 2 KB 528, CA; Koufos v. Czarnikow, The Heron II [1969] AC 350; 
Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v. Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] QB 791, CA. 
71 Payzu Ltd v. Sanders [1919] 2 KB 581, CA; Pilkington v. Wood [1953] Ch 
770; Compania Financiera Soleada SA v. Hamoor Tanker Corp Inc, The Borag [1981] 
1 WLR 274, CA. 
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primary performance obligations of the parties can be altered or varied during 
the life of the contract. In such circumstances, an alternative possible bench- 
mark of fairness is a concept of reasonable expectations. Does the term allow 
the trader to perform, or require the consumer to perform, in a way that is 
different from what the consumer would reasonably have expected? So, in the 
absence of a default rule, we seek to determine reasonable expectations from 
all the circumstances. It is arguable that this approach is implicit in the EU 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive; there being a significant imbalance where a 
term allows for compromise of the reasonable expectations of consumers.72 In 
practice, the European Court of Justice seems to have taken a step in this direction by 
ruling that in the assessment of unfairness ‘it must be determined whether the seller or 
supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that 
the consumer would have agreed to the term concerned in individual contract 
negotiations.’6 This ‘possible agreement test’7 seems to be relatively close to a 
legitimate expectations test. The notion of reasonable expectations also appears to 
function as a benchmark of fairness in U.S. insurance law in particular. 8 
      Of course, there remains a process of interest balancing. The focus may be 
on the expectations of the consumer, but these expectations must be 
objectively reasonable. In addition, it should be borne in mind that 
‘reasonable expectations’ is a potentially very complex concept, there being 
considerable scope for debate, for example, as to the respective roles of 
empirical, normative and institutional elements in its makeup.73 
Then we turn to the broader assessment as to unfairness in substance in the 
context of questions of procedure. As already suggested, broad clauses (for 
example, reasonableness, good faith) seem to accommodate such an analysis. 
So, for example, in the case of the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive, devi- 
ation from a default rule or reasonable expectations (in amounting to a signif- 
icant imbalance in rights and obligations) can then provide the trigger for a 
broader assessment of substance and procedure under the good faith element 
of the test.74 
 
 
 
72 See Willett (note 7), at 5.7.6. On the protection of the ‘legitimate expecta- 
tions’ of consumers as a way of organizing our thinking about EU regulation of unfair 
terms, see T. Wilhelmsson, ‘Unfair Contract Terms’, in G. Howells, C. Twigg-Flesner 
and T. Wilhelmsson, Rethinking EU Consumer Law, (2017). More broadly on this as an 
emerging principle of EU consumer law, see for example H.- 
W. Micklitz (1997), ’Legitime Erwartungen als Gerechtigkeitsprinzip des 
Europäischen Privatrechts’, in L. Krämer, H.-W. Micklitz and K. Tonner (eds), Law 
and Diffuse Interests in the European Legal Order, Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 245–77; 
H.-W. Micklitz (1999/2000), ‘Social Justice in European Private Law’, Yearbook of 
European Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 167–204 and G. Howells and T. 
Wilhelmsson (1997), EC Consumer Law, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 320–23. The  
73 See C. Mitchell (1993), ‘Leading a Life of its Own? The Roles of Reasonable 
Expectation in Contract Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 23(4), pp. 639–65 and 
Willett (note 7), at 4.4 and 5.7.3. 
                                                             
6 Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz [2013], para 77. 
7 Wilhelmsson (2017), section 5. 
8 See Jones v. Horace Mann Insurance Co 937 P 2d (Alaska 1997) and Wheeler v. St Joseph Hospital 63 Cal. App 3d 345, 1976 
Cal App. Lexis 2019, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976). 
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74 Generally on various ways of understanding the relationship between the 
elements of s u c h  tests, Beale (note 11), p. 245, R. Brownsword, G. Howells and 
T. Wilhelmsson (eds) (1994), Welfarism in Contract Law, Aldershot: Dartmouth; 
Bright (note 5), Chen-Wishart (note ??), chapter 9 and Nebbia (note 30), pp. 148–52. 
See also J.R. Peden (1982), The Law of Unjust Contracts, Sydney: Butterworths, p. 36 on the 
role of procedural and substantive elements in the US 
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Before turning to the procedural element in such analysis, we must say a bit 
more about substance. The fact that there is some deviation from the default 
rule or reasonable expectations does not necessarily mean that there is, conclu- 
sively, unfairness in substance. First of all, it seems that general clauses tend 
to allow for consideration of the particular type of substantive consumer inter- 
ests affected by the term (for example, the way in which the term affects phys- 
ical integrity, property and economic interests and interests in access to 
justice).75 Also, in relation to substance, the UK tradition has focused in 
particular on the question as to whether the trader or consumer was in a better 
position to have insured against the risk in question.76 Finally, a broad view of 
fairness in substance might ask whether there is another beneficial term that 
represents a ‘fair price’ for the detrimental term. 
Taking into account the interests just mentioned seems to represent an 
attempt to achieve what we described above as commutative justice as 
between the parties. However, we also referred above to a fairness model in 
which there is a more distributive agenda, that is, where there is a focus on 
enhancing the position of weak groups of citizens in comparison with other 
groups. A general test of fairness, whether expressed in terms of good faith, 
reasonableness etc., does indeed seem sufficiently flexible to take account of 
the particularly vulnerable consumer who is in a weaker position than average 
when it comes to absorbing the consequences of particular substantive 
terms.77 However, this approach is only likely to be taken consistently if the 
regime makes explicit reference to the relevant criteria relating to vulnerabil- 
ity (something that is not done, for example, in the EU Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive). Another necessary requirement of a distributive approach is that 
the general clause on fairness applies to the core price charged under the 
contract, as is the case in the Nordic system but not under the EU Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive.78 Without control of the price, traders can use the 
price to re-allocate to the consumer burdens transferred to the trader by distrib- 
Howells Part 2 30/11/09 8:56 am  Page 185 
 
 
utive policies that are applied to the ancillary terms.9 In addition, for any kind 
of comprehensive distributive agenda, there is a need for the rules to cover not 
only the fairness of the terms as at the time of conclusion of the contract, but 
also post-contractual circumstances. This is needed so that there may, for 
example, be recognition of the ‘social force majeure’ scenario described above 
 
 
 
unconscionability doctrine and see the procedural and substantive elements set out in 
the Australian Consumer Law, s. 24. 
75 See Willett (note 7), at 6.3.3.2. 
76 Ibid., at 6.3.4. 
77 See Willett (note 6), at 6.3.9 on the potential for taking such an approach under the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive; and 
also see the CJEU decision in Case C-415/11 Mohamed Aziz [2013], where the CJEU declared contrary to the Unfair Terms Directive, a 
Spanish procedural rule preventing consumers from using the test of unfairness to challenge a term in a loan agreement in mortgage 
enforcement proceedings (..). One might argue that this approach is motivated to at least some degree by a desire to protect consumers who 
are especially vulnerable (in this case, in the sense that they stand to lose their home). Some have even interpreted this case-law as a judicial 
answer to the problems caused for European consumers by the financial crisis, so H.-W. Micklitz (2015), ‘Conclusions: Consumer 
Over-Indebtedness and Consumer Insolvency – from Micro to Macro’, in H.-W.Micklitz and I. Domurath (eds), Consumer 
Debt and Social Exclusion in Europe, Ashgate, 229-235, at p.233. 
 
78 Article 4(2). 
                                                             
9 : NB that the EU model does provide at least insist on the price being in plain and 
intelligible language as a condition of it escaping the test of unfairness (art 4 (2)), and the 
CJEU has recently held that this requires that the term should not only be ‘grammatically 
intelligible to the consumer’, but the specific functioning of the term and the relationship 
to other terms of the contract should be set out transparently ‘so that that consumer is in a 
position to evaluate, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the economic consequences 
for him which derive from it.’ (Case C-26/13 Árpád Kásler, Hajnalka Káslerné Rábai v OTP 
Jelzálogbank Zrt [2014]). The UK Consumer Rights Act has also insisted on a high level of 
transparency for the price-it must be ‘transparent and ‘prominent’ (s. 64 (3)& (4)). These 
transparency requirements are presumably intended at least to help increase the chances 
that the price is disciplined by market forces, but it is questionable whether charges 
contingent on later events (eg exceeding an overdraft limit, failing to check in online) will 
ever be sufficiently focused on by consumers to allow such market discipline. The new 
Australian regime appears to recognize this by refusing to treat such contingent charges as 
excluded price terms (Australian Consumer Law, s. 26 (1) (b), Commonwealth of Australia, 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) 
Bill (No 2) 2010, para 229). See C. Willett (2013), ‘Transparency and Fairness in 
Australian and UK Regulation of Standard Terms’, 37(1) University of 
Western Australia Law Review 72. 
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(where the law protects consumers whose social circumstances have – post- 
contractually – become such that special protection is needed). Again, this 
approach is taken in Nordic law but not under the EU Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, which focuses purely on the circumstances existing at the conclu- 
sion of the contract.79 
It was also mentioned above that a fairness test may seek to further other 
societal policies. Some brief examples can be given here. In the particular 
context of the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive, the good faith element of 
the test pays particular attention to the idea of solidarity amongst users, 
particularly where ‘collective’ services (that is, public services or services of 
general interest) are concerned. It is certainly arguable that this calls for special 
attention to be paid to notions of equality both in relation to access to the 
service and in relation to general treatment under the contract. This may, 
inter alia, imply a targeting of terms allowing for differential pricing and 
discriminatory approaches to variation or termination of the contract.80 
In addition, a general clause such as that in the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive may also be able to give particular emphasis to human rights inter- 
ests.81 So, for example, terms may be particularly likely to be unfair where 
they impinge on rights of access to education or to private life and home (for 
example, terms allowing for withdrawal of education, eviction from property, 
forfeiture of property etc.).10 
Turning to procedure, the logical approach to general clauses appears to be 
to view the substantive position in the light of procedural issues. A term is 
more likely to be fair, the greater the degree of procedural fairness, that is the 
more transparent the term was, the more choice was available and the more the 
consumer was in a stronger than normal bargaining position, such that he 
could have protected his interests at the time of the contract. The less evidence 
of such procedural fairness, the more likely the term will be unfair. Of course, 
given the fundamental role of consent in contract, it must surely be the case 
that transparency is the most fundamental aspect of procedural fairness. These 
sorts of approach to the interaction between substance and procedure appear 
to be accommodated within the test of unfairness in any general clause that is 
sufficiently flexible. 
Of course, even if many of the tests we have been considering are broadly 
 
 
 
79 Article 4(1). 
80 See Willett (note 7), at 6.3.5; and elsewhere in this volume, see Rott and Willett, 
Chapter 11. 
81 See S. Whittaker (2001), ‘Judicial Review in Public Law and in Contract 
Law: The Example of “Student Rules”’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 193–217, at 
p. 213 and Willett (note 7), at 6.3.5. 
                                                             
10 See above on the Aziz case protecting consumers at risk of losing their home.  
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similar to the extent that they focus on a combined substantive/procedural 
analysis, the more specific approaches taken may differ in relation to the levels 
of (substantive and/or procedural) fairness required. So, for example, at one 
end of the spectrum, there is an approach setting a very low level of fairness; 
there only being a cause of action where the consumer is in a particularly weak 
position (that is, weaker than the average consumer) and this weakness is in 
some way taken advantage of by the imposition of extremely substantively 
unfair terms. This appears to be the approach under the English uncon- 
scionability concept and possibly under the Australian common law approach 
to unconscionability.82 Towards the other end of the spectrum is an approach 
that focuses on more routine unfairness (for example, unfairness in substance 
being found in significant – but not necessarily extreme – deviations from 
default rules and procedural unfairness being found in the routine lack of 
transparency and disparity of bargaining power as between traders and 
consumers generally). This seems to be the approach under the EU Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive83 under the modern statutory approach to 
unconscionability in Australia, and under the new Australian Consumer Law 
regime.84 The US approach is more difficult to pin down. It may be 
somewhere in the middle. Certainly, there are tendencies to look for more 
extreme unfairness,85 while the pattern is not necessarily wholly consistent, 
with a higher standard sometimes being set.86 
Another question that may be asked goes very much to the interplay 
between procedure and substance; the question being whether a fairness test 
should be capable of finding a term to be unfair, based principally on its 
substantive features irrespective of procedural fairness. Of course, this can be 
done by a specific rule banning the term in question. However, general clauses 
like the good faith element of the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive test 
seem flexible enough to achieve this result as well; the argument is that, 
while the procedural fairness weighs in favour of fairness, a particularly 
substantively detrimental term outweighs this and results in a finding of 
unfairness.87 This is particularly important, given the 
 
 
 
82 See Commercial Bank of Australia v. Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 46 ALR 
442 (HCA) and D. Harland (1999), ‘Unconscionable and Unfair Contracts: An 
Australian Perspective’, in R. Brownsword, N. Hird and G. Howells (eds), Good Faith 
in Contract: Concept and Context, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 243–67.  
83 See Willett (note 7), at 3.4 and 8.1; but note that the open textured nature of 
general clauses allows for significant variations in approach based on national 
traditions and individual judicial ethics – see Willett, General Clauses and the 
Competing Ethics of EU Consumer law (note ??). 
84 See Harland (note ??), at p. 249, and see the special edition of the University of Western Australia 
Law Review ((2013) 37(1)) (note ??). 
85 See Winn and Webber (note ??), pp. 9, 14–17. 
86 Ibid., p. 17. 
87 Ibid., at 6.5.  
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likely limits in practice of procedural fairness. Even where terms are transpar- 
ent, there are many good reasons to suppose that they will not be read and 
understood by consumers.88 
The European Court of Justice appears to accept the idea that substantive fairness should 
be viewed as the dominant element in the good faith concept under the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive. For example in both the Oceano and Freiburger cases, the CJEU said 
that where there is no benefit at all to a consumer then the term fails the test under the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive.11 : If by ‘benefit’ the CJEU means a substantive 
benefit under the contract, the conclusion would appear to be that in such a case the 
term is unfair irrespective of the existence of procedural fairness. Further, in the Aziz 
case the Court in deciding whether imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of 
good faith’, stated that what matters is whether this is a term that consumers would 
agree to if they could negotiate, which surely refers to what substantive term 
they would have agreed to. So, if the actual term used is significantly less 
substantively fair than this, it seems clear that the view of the CJEU is that such 
a term is in violation of the good faith requirement. 
Notwithstanding this CJEU position, there remain questions as to whether such a 
departure from traditional freedom of contract thinking has yet been fully accepted at 
Member State level, in particular in the UK, where there seems to remain a reluctance 
to fully commit to the idea that terms can be unfair on substantive grounds even 
although they are transparent.12 At the same time, rather ironically, the European spirit 
of substantive fairness seems to have been more clearly embraced in Australia, where 
it appears that transparency cannot legitimize sufficiently substantively unfair terms.13  
 
6. Collective protection mechanisms 
Private law action against unfair terms only affects the use of the term in ques- 
tion as between the two parties to the action. Even if the term is set aside, there 
is nothing to prevent the trader continuing to use the term in contracts with 
other consumers. Costs and other deterrents to individual private law action 
will mean that there will only be relatively few private law actions. It is fairly 
self-evident that this form of enforcement will have a very limited impact on 
the use of unfair terms. This was indeed the case under the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act in the UK, which only provided for private law enforcement. 
Before the introduction of preventive control mechanisms under the r eg i m e  
i m pl em en t i n g  th e  Un fa i r  T er m s Di r ect i ve ,  large numbers of terms 
that may well have failed the Unfair Contract Terms Act reasonableness test 
continued to be used.89 
The obvious response is some form of preventive control.14 One possible 
                                                             
11 see Océano Case C-240-244/98, ECR [2000] I-4941 and Freiburger Kommunalbauten v. Hofstetter, Case C- 237/02, ECR [2004] I-
3403. 
 
12 The Functions of Transparency in Regulating Contract Terms: UK and Australian Approaches (2011), 60 (2), 355-385. 
 
13 Willett, ‘Transparency and Fairness in Australian and UK Regulation of Standard Terms’ (note ??); although see C. Willett,  
on whether it is yet  
 
14 In addition, the development of small claims procedures may also have an impact. The EU Unfair Contract Terms 
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approach to this is a system within which standard terms can only be used 
when they are the product of negotiation and agreement (between traders and 
either a government agency or consumer organisations). Of course this has the 
advantage of dealing with the problem from the very beginning, preventing 
any unfair term being used in the first place and causing detriment. However, 
there are serious drawbacks: enormous resources may need to be devoted to 
 
 
 
 
88 On the limits of transparency generally, see G. Howells (2005), ‘The Potential and 
Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information?’, Journal of Law and Society, 349–
70; Wilhelmsson (note 9), pp. 55–6 and Willett (note 7), at 2.4.3.4. Also, in this 
context, the work of the behavioural economists again becomes relevant – see 
Korobkin (note 13) and Della Vigna and Malmender (note 14). 
89 On the limits of private law, see I. Ramsay (2012), Consumer Law and Policy 
Text Cases and Materials on Regulating Consumer Markets, Oxford, UK and Portland, 
OR, US: Hart Publishing, 3 r d  e dn,  p. 10 5 -8 . The Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1994, then 1999 (now repealed and replaced by the unfair 
terms regime in the Consumer Rights Act 2015) were introduced to implement the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive, which, as we shall see below, required (inter alia) 
preventive control mechanisms. The work of the Office of Fair Trading (now 
Competition and Markets Authority) under these Regulations revealed large numbers 
of exemption clauses (the largest single category of terms) still being used, despite the 
fact that very many of them would probably have failed the test under the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 (see the many examples in the Office of Fair Trading 
Bulletins on Unfair Terms published since 1994). 
                                                             
Directive has in practice, somewhat surprisingly, been used to remove and lower procedural thresholds and obstacles for 
consumer cases of this kind. The CJEU has in a long row of cases underlined the responsibility of the deciding court to react 
to unfairness ex officio, see more closely T. Wilhelmsson, ‘Unfair Contract Terms’ in G. Howells, C. Twigg-Flesner and T. 
Wilhelmsson, Rethinking EU Consumer Law (note xx), Section 6 and S. Weatherill (2013), EU Consumer Law and Policy, 2nd 
ed., Edward Elgar, 157-158. 
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the process, and agreement may take a long time or never be achieved at all.90 
Another possibility is for government to draft mandatory terms for all situa- 
tions, precluding use of any other terms. However, this would require a huge 
investment of government time and would always be at risk of failing to cover 
all possible circumstances. The best that can be hoped for are less ambitious 
versions of this approach within which a certain number of compulsory terms 
are provided for, traders being free to use their own terms for other issues 
(subject, of course, to some other form of preventive control being used where 
the terms turn out to be unfair).91 A variant of this approach is one where 
consumer bodies draft terms and try to obtain the agreement of traders to use 
these terms. However, experience of this approach is not good, with the 
proposed terms often being rejected by traders.92 
Within a system in which traders draft their own terms, the ‘earliest’ form 
of control comes where these terms cannot be used until they have been pre- 
validated by some government agency or by consumer bodies. A problem here 
is that this may be very time and resource-consuming for the body scrutinis- 
ing the terms, given that they must cover all the proposed terms. Another 
possible model is one in which traders are free to use terms but may choose to 
submit them for approval to a government agency or consumer body.93 If the 
terms are approved, they are then free from public or private law challenge for 
a particular period, while if they are not approved, they cannot be used. A key 
problem with this approach is that the control is in the hands of the traders in 
that it is they who decide whether to submit terms for approval. 
The model that has taken hold in the EU derives from Article 7 of the EU 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive, which requires member states to ensure that 
adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair 
terms, including provisions whereby persons or organisations may take action 
 
 
 
90 See E. Hondius (1987), Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, Utrecht: 
Molengraaf Institut voor Privaatrecht, for a discussion of problems arising in the Dutch 
experience of negotiation between traders and consumer bodies. 
91 Some terms are compulsory simply in the sense that they are default rules that 
cannot be excluded or restricted in any circumstances, although there is no actual oblig- 
ation to set out the content of the terms in a written contract (see, for example, the 
approach to the terms as to description, quality and fitness for purpose in contracts 
for the sale and supply of goods, digital content and services in the UK (Consumer 
Rights Act 2015, ss. 31, 41 & 57. It is very common in continental law to 
introduce partially mandatory rules for certain contract types, and it can be 
found in EU law as well, most notably in the EU Consumer Sales Directive.- 
In other cases, there is an actual obligation to set out the content of the terms in a 
written contract (see, for example, the UK Consumer Credit Act, s. 61). 
92 See C. Scott and J. Black (2000), Cranston’s Consumers and the Law, 3rd 
edition, London: Butterworths, p. 101. 
93 See the Standard Contracts Law of 1964 in Israel and the discussion by S. 
Deutsch (1990), ‘Control of Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts in Israel: Law and 
Practice’, Journal of Consumer Policy, pp. 188–99. 
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according to the national law concerned before the courts or before competent 
administrative bodies for a decision as to whether contractual terms drawn up for 
general use are unfair, so that they can apply appropriate and effective means to 
prevent the continued use of such terms. This clearly requires that member states 
provide for some form of preventive action for injunctions to be taken against 
unfair terms. As to the main agents of such actions, there are considerable vari- 
ations between the traditions prevailing in Europe; and these differences are 
recognised by the Directive (referring as it does to bodies ‘recognised under 
national law’ and to action being taken ‘according to the national law 
concerned’). On the one hand, in many continental countries, such as Germany, 
consumer organisations have played and continue to play a decisive role, whilst 
in other countries various kinds of public bodies, such as the Nordic ‘consumer 
ombudsmen’ take action where terms being used are alleged to be unfair.94 In 
the UK, Art 7 was implemented by giving powers to a variety of bodies to 
seek injunctions to prevent the continued use of unfair terms about which there 
have been complaints.95 The main body is one closely linked to central 
government, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which replaced 
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in 2014. 
In practice, of course, what happens is that when a body such as the CMA 
or a consumer ombudsman receives a complaint and the conclusion is reached 
that the term is unfair, there is an attempt to negotiate the removal or amend- 
ment of the term, there only being a need for an injunction where such nego- 
tiation is unsuccessful. These powers have been a foundation for the 
enforcement bodies to persuade traders to remove or amend large numbers 
of terms.96 The broad consensus in the UK at least is that the OFT (now CMA) 
has been very successful in its role of removing unfair contract terms from the 
market.97 Clearly part of the reason for the success is the basic availability of 
powers to 
 
 
 
94 See generally T. Wilhelmsson (1992), ‘Administrative Procedures for the 
Control of Marketing Practices – Theoretical Rationale and Perspectives’, Journal of 
Consumer Policy, 15(2), 159–77. 
95 Consumer Rights Act 2015, Sch. 2, art 3. In the Australian system, by contrast, 
only a government body (the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) has 
injunctive powers – see Australian Consumer Law 2010-CHECK. 
96 See the Unfair Contract Terms Bulletins 1–29 covering cases dealt with from the 
passing of the initial 1994 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations until 
September 2004; and see the lists of Unfair Terms Cases with Undertakings that 
replaced the bulletins and run from October 2004 to the most recent in March 2006 
(available on the Consumer Regulations Website, http://www.crw.gov.uk; accessed 31 
July 2008).  
97 See, for example, Bright (note 5), p. 331 and National Audit Office (1999), The 
Office of Fair Trading: Protecting the Consumer from Unfair Trading Practices, 
London: The Stationery Office, paras 17–19; but for a contrary view see C. Gillette 
(2005), ‘Pre-approved Contracts for Internet Commerce’, Houston Law Review, 975–
1013, at p. 987 in particular. 
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seek injunctions, that is, the fact that there is a legal sanction. However, 
another element is the fact that the OFT/CMA often negotiates with trade 
associations, avoiding the need to conduct too many separate negotiations and 
harnessing the desire of such associations to avoid bad publicity and to 
maintain good working relations with the OFT/CMA.98  
The EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive even prescribes that collective legal 
remedies may be directed against business associations which use or 
recommend the use of general contractual terms.15 
 
     Following the tradition in many other European countries, injunctive 
powers in the UK are also available to a range of other bodies, such as the 
Consumers’ Association (although these powers have not as yet been used). 
In the Nordic countries too, consumer associations have standing in these 
cases. Providing a role for bodies other than public ones clearly broadens 
the experience and expertise base and can also be seen as important to the 
democracy of the process. Of course it is also important that a system based 
on a multiplicity of enforcement bodies should be properly co-ordinated. 
This is vital if there is to be consistency and appropriate targeting in 
enforcement. 
Another important dimension is the power of the enforcer (in the UK case, 
the OFT/CMA) to publish information and advice as to the operation of the 
system.99 In furtherance of these powers, the OFT/CMA have issued a 
considerable body of guidance on unfairness, which has informed their 
approach to enforcement.100 This has presumably aided traders and their 
advisers in understanding and complying with the law;101 and presumably 
also aided consumers and their advisers in recognising breaches of the law. 
This is of particular importance in a system of control based on a general 
clause (that is, in ‘fleshing out’ the detail of the way to understand and apply 
the broad – and potentially vague – general clause). 
Another aspect to the approach applying in the UK is that in the shadow of 
the legal standards (and often in negotiation with the OFT/CMA) we find that 
trade bodies are developing model (and fair) standard terms.102 In fact there 
is another influence at work here: if codes of practice require the use of 
fair 
 
 
 
98 See Bright (note 5), p. 335 
99 See for the UK, Consumer Rights Act, Sch. 2, art 7. 
100   Generally see the CMA website: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-
markets-authority 
        The most notable general guidelines are those contained in the OFT Guidance of 2001. There have also 
been guidelines for particular sectors, for example, consumer entertainment contracts (2003), care 
home contracts (2003), home improvement contracts (2005), holiday caravan contracts (2005), and 
package holiday contracts (2004), and more recently, see the work carried out on unfair terms in 
health and fitness clubs (2013), on unfair terms related to late payment (2015), and the Unfair terms 
explained for businesses: individual guides (covering deposits, advance payments and cancellation 
                                                             
15 The European Court of Justice has expressly demanded the implementation of this option, see Case C-372/99 
Commission v Italy [2002] ECR I-819. 
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charges, how and when a contract can be cancelled, excessive charges and disproportionate sanctions, 
exclusion and variation clauses, and subscriptions and automatic rollovers) (2016).  
101 This is of particular importance given the traditional concerns as to the uncer- 
tainty caused by broad standards of fairness. Any such uncertainty may not only be a 
cost for businesses but may also make it more difficult for businesses to comply. 
102 See, for example, the Kitchen Bedroom Bathroom Specialists Association 
model terms referred to by the Office of Fair Trading at http://www.oft.gov.uk/ 
news/press/2006/16-06.(CHECK-can’t find anymore)
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terms, this improves the chances of the Code more generally receiving OFT 
approval.103 
 
7. Conclusions: internationalisation 
Despite the different traditions of approaching the problem of unfair terms and 
standard form contracts, described above as four models of approach (the no 
particular problem model, the standard form contract model, the consumer 
protection model and the general fairness model), internationally there seems 
to be some convergence between the approaches, in particular in the field of 
consumer contracts. Those starting from a no particular problem model are 
implementing measures at least to protect consumers and the other models do 
not differ so much in the core area of the issue, that is with regard to the need 
to protect consumers against unduly detrimental standard terms. At least with 
regard to standard terms in consumer contracts, general clauses to combat 
unfairness are rather commonplace. While the general clauses may differ in 
expression they share a broad focus on the substance of the terms, the way in 
which they balance the interests of the parties and the way in which the agree- 
ment was brought about. 
Still, of course there remain large differences reflecting national and 
regional traditions and priorities. So, there are, for example, differences in 
relation to the terms covered; how much focus is placed on procedural fairness 
and how much on fairness in substance; and, indeed, what exactly amounts to 
procedural fairness and fairness in substance. 
From the perspective of regional and international trade this state of affairs 
has caused concern. The existence of different fairness regimes affecting 
consumer contracts in different countries is regarded as an obstacle to trade 
between these countries. Traders that plan to market their products and 
services across borders are thought to experience higher transaction costs as 
they need to check their terms with regard to different national regimes. They 
may also face ‘hidden traps’104 in foreign countries which they could not fore- 
see. Some also claim that consumers are put off shopping across borders and 
making use of enlarged regional markets because of lack of trust in varying 
 
 
 
103 See s. 8 of the Enterprise Act in the UK which allows the OFT to approve 
codes and allow the use of a symbol of this approval. The criteria for approval include 
transparency and fairness in relation to contract terms – see Office of Fair Trading 
(2001), OFT’s Core Criteria for the New Approach to Codes of Practice, in the Office 
of Fair Trading response to the consultation on Codes of Practice, Annex C, at 
3(c).CHECK 
104 This term is taken from H. Beale (2002), ‘Finding the Remaining Traps 
instead of Unifying Contract Law’, in S. Grundmann and J. Stuyck (eds), An Academic 
Green Paper on European Contract Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 
67–72. 
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foreign fairness rules.105 Even though these claims usually are not based on 
any convincing empirical evidence, they have led to regional harmonisation 
movements. The adoption of the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive, 
attempting to harmonise the rules on unfair contract terms in consumer 
contracts in the member states, is probably the best example of such efforts. 
However, even within the EU, despite the Directive, there remain differ- 
ences. First of all, the Directive is a minimum Directive, allowing member 
states to maintain or adopt higher levels of protection.106 So, for example, the 
Nordic countries have chosen to take advantage of this to maintain their more 
fully fledged protectionist approach and continue to apply the fairness test to 
individually negotiated terms and to the core terms of the contract. Secondly, 
even within the general clause, there is such flexibility that it is inevitable that 
national courts, drawing on national tradition and perspective, will take 
varying approaches to the issues of proce- dure and substance, their interaction 
and their application to specific terms. This scope for variation appears likely 
to be supported by the European Court of Justice. The line taken appears to be 
that there will only be interference with the approach taken by national courts 
where the term is wholly to the benefit of the trader, there being no benefit in 
the term (or elsewhere in the contract) for the consumer. Where any such 
benefit is identified by the European Court of Justice, the suggestion is that it 
will be left to the national court to apply the test to the term within the national 
legal context.109 In later years, however, the European Court of Justice seems 
to have been more engaged in building at least some features of a European 
doctrine of fairness.16
 
The above discussion reveals that harmonisation by reference to general 
clauses on unfairness is unlikely to produce identical approaches to unfairness 
and identical standard terms in different countries. Of course, this may be 
viewed as desirable to the extent that one considers it important to retain scope 
for national legal traditions to flourish and for local expectations as to fairness 
to be reflected.110 However, to the extent that there is an agenda to eliminate 
barriers to trade, there is a potential problem. One solution to this may lie in 
 
 
105 For a criticism of this claim, see T. Wilhelmsson (2004), ‘The Abuse of the 
“Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC Consumer Law’, Journal of Consumer 
Policy, 317–37. 
106 See Article 8. 
107 Regulations 5(1) and 6(2). 
108 See English and Scottish Law Commissions (2005), at 31–5. 
109 Freiburger Kommunalbauten v. Hofstetter, Case C–237/02, ECR [2004] I- 
3403. This reasoning is followed up in other cases, for example Case C-76/10 
Pohotovosť s.r.o. v Iveta Korčkovská [2010] ECR I-11557 (penalty clause in 
credit agreement) and Case C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v 
Invitel Távközlési Zrt. [2012] (term on unilateral amendment of fees for a 
service). 
110 See many of the contributions in T. Wilhelmsson, E. Paunio and A. Pohjolainen 
(eds) (2007), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
                                                             
16 H-W. Micklitz and N. Reich (2014), ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty: The Revival of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
(UCTD)’, 51 CMLR, 771-808. 
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more rigorous co-operation in standard setting and enforcement as between 
the national regulatory bodies. In the EU, closer cooperation between 
enforcement agencies is indeed promoted.111 A more far-reaching and distant 
solution is to step further from harmonising the unfairness regimes towards 
unifying parts of contract law in general. Indeed, one of the starting points for 
the work on a harmonised European contract law that started promisingly112 
but now has more or less faded,17 was the insight that a harmonisation of 
unfairness rules does not, in itself, eliminate the differences. 
As general unification of consumer contract law is not an issue for the 
immediate future,113 certainly globally but also regionally,18 in cross-border 
trade, choice of law rules will continue to play a role. In consumer relation- 
ships, the use of such highly developed and technical rules is of course 
deplorable, but can probably not be avoided. 
Anyway, also in the rules concerning private international law the need for 
consumer protection is often reflected to some extent. From a consumer 
 
 
 
111 See Regulation 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities 
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws (the Regulation on 
Consumer Protection Cooperation), OJ L364/1. 
112 Three Communications of the Commission laid the  foundations  for  the present 
work: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on European Contract Law, COM(2001) 398 final, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A More Coherent 
European Contract Law. An Action Plan, COM(2003) 68 final and Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European Contract 
Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward, COM(2004) 651 final. The liter- 
ature on the subject is already vast; a reference to the ‘paradigmatic’ collections is 
sufficient in this context: A. Hartkamp et al. (eds) (2004), Towards a European Civil 
Code, 3rd edition, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri and S. Grundmann and J. Stuyck (eds), 
An Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, pp. 67–72. Interesting multidisciplinary analyses can be found in J. Smits 
(ed.) (2005), The Need for a European Contract Law, Groningen: Europa Law 
Publishing. 
113 The most important international convention in the area, The United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, does not apply to 
consumer contracts (Article 2(a)). 
114 See in this volume the chapter by Rothchild and Quirk, Chapter 12. 
                                                             
17 But resulting in the Draft Common Frame of Reference. Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law 
(Sellier 2009). 
18 In EU plans for a comprehensive Consumer Rights Directive, consolidating unfair contract terms legislation and other 
consumer contracts legislation in one maximum directive, did not lead to the intended broad results. Cpr the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European parliament and of the Council on consumer rights COM(2008) 614 with the resulting Directive 
2011/83/EU on consumer rights, containing mostly only provisions on details concerning information and cooling-off 
periods in certain situations. 
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protection perspective, one important point is to ensure that a choice of law 
clause does not deprive the consumer of protection by selecting a less protec- 
tive regime. The EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive provides expressly that 
member states should ensure that a consumer does not lose the protection of 
the Directive by virtue of a choice of law of a non-member state if a contract 
has a close connection with the territory of one of the member states.115 More 
generally, within the EU, the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations states that within certain consumer contracts a choice 
of law shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection 
afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the country in which he has his 
habitual residence.116 Secondly, even where no choice of law clause is used in 
the contract, the rules of private international law should ensure that the 
consumer is not unexpectedly confronted with rules from a jurisdiction he did 
not anticipate. Also in this respect, the Rome Convention provides that the 
said consumer contracts shall be governed by the law of the consumer’s habit- 
ual residence.117 However, the definition of the consumer contracts covered 
by these particular provisions of the Rome Convention is limited. So, for 
example, in cases where the consumer contracts from his country of residence 
with a trader in another country, he is only protected by the Rome Convention 
where the contract was preceded by a specific invitation or by advertising. In 
addition, the Rome Convention only ever provides that a consumer cannot be 
deprived of the protective regime of his country of habitual residence. This 
would not protect a consumer from a non-EU country who is only temporar- 
ily resident in an EU country. More comprehensive protection for consumers 
is indeed proposed in the UK.118 This may to some extent be seen to address 
the problem discussed above to the effect that differing approaches to the fair- 
ness concept as between member states may undermine consumer confidence 
in the use of the European market. However, irrespective of the chosen solu- 
tion, a recurrent application of complicated choice of law rules does not appear 
to be a very efficient means of protecting small-scale contractors like 
consumers. 
It is likely that the problems related to lack of harmonisation and choice of 
law will become more acute and difficult in the years to come. The problems 
related to the regionalisation and internationalisation of consumer markets are 
becoming particularly acute in the rapidly growing field of e-commerce. In 
this area, both the general problem of keeping a sufficient level of consumer 
protection irrespective of where the trader operates, as well as difficult legal 
issues related to choice of law and jurisdiction, appear to be almost unsolvable, 
and call for particular solutions. These will be discussed, however, elsewhere 
in this volume.114 
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